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INTRODUCTION

Michael Ignatieff, the director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is not a lawyer. His work, how
ever, treats issues of core concern to lawyers: nation-building, human rights,
the ethics of warfare, and now, in his latest book, the proper relationship
1
between liberty and security. The Lesser Evil is, in part, a book a legal
scholar might have written: a normative framework for lawmaking in the
face of the terror threat. It is also something more unusual: an exercise in an
older type of jurisprudence. Ignatieff discusses law in the light of moral
psychology and a general view about the nature of value, but in a way that
respects the concrete, practical character of legal decisions and does not
make law hostage to philosophy. The book should thus be read on two lev
els: as a contribution to current legal debates about balancing liberty and
security and as an object lesson in the value and limitations of Ignatieff's
heterodox approach to law.

*

Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. I997, Harvard; J.D. 2001, Yale. -Ed.
I am indebted to James Boyle, Jeff Powell, Chris Schroeder, and Neil Siegel for comments on an
earlier draft of this essay, and to David Grewal and Pratap Mehta for years of conversation on these
themes.
1. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, EMPIRE LITE: NATION-BUILDING IN BOSNIA, Kosovo, A F
GHANISTAN (2003) [hereinafter EMPIRE LITE]; MICHAEL IGNATIEFF WITH K. ANTHONY APPIAH ET
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDoLATRY (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) [hereinafter IGNATIEFF
ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS]; MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: Kosovo AND BEYOND (2000); MI
CHAEL lGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN CONSCIENCE (1998)
[hereinafter IGNATIEFF, WARRIOR'S HONOR].
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A word about Ignatieff's approach is due before discussing the main ar
gument of The Lesser Evil. Ignatieff first came to prominence as a
philosophically minded journalist who took the Balkan wars of the 1990s as
2
an occasion to reflect on modem warfare and then cemented his reputation
as a student of the legal, political, and ethical dimensions of the human
3
rights revolution. One could know all this, though, without knowing the two
chief sources of his method: the jurisprudence of the Scottish Enlightenment
4
and the thought of the late Isaiah Berlin. One cannot understand lgnatieff's
distinctive approach without appreciating each of these influences.
The jurists of the Scottish Enlightenment, particularly Adam Smith, un
derstood political, social, and economic life as a play of what they called
5
"the passions." By that term they did not mean what we often denote by
"passion" today: a powerful impulse or need, expressing something essen
tial about personality

or identity,

which overrides the constraints of

convention and reason. Our modem use is classical, and specifically Pla
tonic, in its opposition between reason and passion; it is also Romantic in its
tendency to honor passion as more authentic than, and in this respect poten
6
tially superior to, reason. The Scots, by contrast, used "passions" to refer to
a constellation of deep-seated and widespread motivations that, taken to
gether, formed the basic vocabulary of a fluid, dynamic account of human
7
nature. The passions were broadly divisible into social passions, including
desire for the esteem of others and sympathy, the wish for one's sentiments
to be in harmony with those of others; antisocial passions, particularly the
appetite for dominating or lording it over others, which the theorists of pas
sions regarded as a basic and pervasive motive; and asocial passions, chiefly
intellectual and aesthetic, including a delight in order and regularity and,
8
straining against this, a thrill at chaos and disruption.

2.

See IGNATIEFF, WARRIOR'S HONOR, supra note I.

3.

See IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note I.

4. Very early in his career, lgnatieff published Wealth and Vinue, an edited collection of
scholarly essays on the Scottish Enlightenment. WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL
EcONOMY IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (Istvan Hont & Michael lgnatieff eds., 1983). Years
later, shortly after Isaiah Berlin's death at the end of 1997, Ignatieff published a book on which he
had long been at work: an intellectual biography of Berlin, whom he had come to know over years
of conversation and study. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, ISAIAH BERLIN: A LIFE (1998).
5. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner & W.B. Todd eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776); ADAM
SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1823);
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2002) (1759). See generally THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT
(Alexander Broadie ed., 2003).
6. On these distinctions, see CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
7. I discuss the taxonomy of the passions in somewhat greater theory in Jedediah Purdy, A
World of Passions: How to Think About Globalization Now, IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. , Summer
2004, at 1, 21-34.
8.

Id. at24.
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This view of human nature left little room for the Platonic and Kantian
idea of moral reasoning as the clear specification of rational principles that
should govern the unruly appetites and passions. The Scots regarded pas
sions as too essential, pervasive, and polyvalent to be overridden by a
stylized reason. They instead envisioned moral life as itself the product of
the passions, a domain of life to be interpreted through the play of its con
stituent motives. For the Scots, moral reasoning therefore consisted not in

prescription, that is, laying out sets of principles and rules to guide action,
but rather in diagnosis, understanding how a given social order set in motion

9
one play of the passions or another. Moral life was as natural as hunger,
sex, or language; but it could take very different forms, some characterized

by violence and domination, others by reciprocity and mutual forbearance.

ID

Philosophers sought to understand how new situations, such as the rise of
capitalism and the spread of slavery in Europe's colonies, reshaped the
11
moral lives of those who inhabited them.
This has been lgnatieff's approach to his topics; it distinguishes him
from most scholars in and outside the legal academy. In his writing on the
ethics of warfare, he has not begun from the principles of just war theory or
international law. Instead, he has started with the facts of a world in which
wars are increasingly fought not by nation-states with well-organized ar
mies, but by whole peoples, as in the Rwandan genocide, or bands of
12
irregulars that make little distinction between civilian and combatant. The
title of Ignatieff's first book on this theme, The Warrior's Honor, indicates
his attention to how combatants understand the ethical constraints of the
13
Similarly, his work on human rights has ad

new kinds of wars they fight.

dressed not so much the proper definition of universal and inviolable rights
as the question how people come to care for, and feel obligated by, the suf
14

fering of faraway persons and culturally remote peoples.

Isaiah Berlin's contribution to Ignatieff's approach is sometimes called
"value pluralism," a more ungainly term than Berlin himself would likely
15
have used. The heart of the idea is that there is not, and cannot be, a single,
coherent, comprehensive solution to moral, legal, or political questions, be
cause human life is marked by loyalty to competing, incompatible, but
16
legitimate values. The world is too rich with value, or too cacophonous, to
allow us one final answer to the great question, "What should we do?" For

9.

See id.

1 0.

See id.

1 1.

See id.

1 2.

See IGNATIEFF, WARRIOR'S HONOR, supra note I.

1 3.

Id.

1 4. See IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note I; see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE
NEEDS OF STRANGERS (1984).
1 5. The term is used, for instance, in John Gray's treatment of Berlin's thought. See JOHN
GRAY, 1\vo FACES OF LIBERALISM 34 (2000).
1 6. See ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS I (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds. , 1 997).
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instance, we choose between, or trade off against each other, liberty and
security; loyalty to our particular cultures and traditions and cosmopolitan
duty to the entire human race; the freedom to be left alone and the freedom
affirmatively to shape our own lives (what Berlin famously called "negative"
17
and "positive" liberty). The balances we reach cannot be uniquely right, to
the exclusion of all other answers, because all such choices are tragic in the
strict sense that they involve the sacrifice of some legitimate values on be
half of others.
The consequence of Berlin's value pluralism was what one might call
liberal skepticism, the recognition that in a world of valid and inconsistent
values, trying to enforce one true answer for everyone can bring moral and
political disaster. Berlin believed that at least a part, and probably a large
part, of the totalitarian experience of twentieth-century politics stemmed
from the moral arrogance of rulers who sought to enforce a single vision of
human life and violently cleared away whatever did not comport with it:
Russian kulaks, Chinese dissidents, and the other victims of history. Fas
cism, too, Berlin understood as a rejection of value pluralism, a desperate
and fantastical rebellion against morally ambiguous modernity and an at
tempt to erect in its place the temples of one's own church and tribe, which
would forever erase the premises of liberal skepticism.
Value pluralism is the implicit premise of Ignatieff's discussion of lib
erty and security. He seems firmly to believe that there is no one formula
that will guide us through the jurisprudential and legislative decisions of an
age of terror. Instead, the best we can do is to try to understand precisely
and carefully the values that are at stake in our decisions and the ways in
which they are interrelated, and on the basis of this understanding formulate
some rules of prudence to help our judgment.
The objection to approaches such as Ignatieff's is familiar: that descrip
tion is all well and good, but in the end we must reach decisions, and when
we do we will need principles to guide us. From this perspective, lgnatieff's
psychological and sociological inquiry is at best a halfway house, at worst a
kind of speculative, high-toned journalism that evades the hard business of
saying what we should do, and why.

The Lesser Evil is, among other things, the author's best attempt to an
swer this objection. More than lgnatieff's earlier work, it approaches
specific problems of governance and criminal justice in counterterror cam
paigns. Whether or not it is entirely satisfactory, the book itself is the best
test of Ignatieff's heterodox approach. The book sheds light on its topic and
also on its own method.
I. DEFINING THE LESSER EVIL

The Lesser Evil is a multilayered book. It ranges far while managing to
maintain a coherent center. In this Review, I proceed as Ignatieff does, first

17. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND,
supra note 16, at 191 .
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laying out his prescriptions for the proper balance of liberty and security,
then considering how far his method succeeds in guiding and supporting
those conclusions.
lgnatieff proposes that "all coercive measures" adopted in pursuit of a
war on terror should be subjected to five tests, each of which captures an
18
important democratic value. The first test, "the dignity test," asks whether
the proposed measures violate individual dignity. This standard "should al
ways preclude cruel and unusual punishment, torture, penal servitude, and
extrajudicial execution, as well as rendition of suspects to rights-abusing
countries" (p.

24). He calls the second "the conservative test," a rhetorically

convenient (and somewhat evasive) name for what one might also call a
civil-libertarian test. As lgnatieff puts the question, "[d]o [the coercive
measures at issue] damage our institutional inheritance? Such a standard
would bar indefinite suspension of habeas corpus and require all detention,
whether by civil or military authorities, to be subject to judicial review" (p.

24). Ignatieff's third test is an "effectiveness test," which asks whether the
proposed measures will make citizens more or less secure in the long run
for instance by increasing or decreasing international support for terror
ists-and not just in the exigencies of a present crisis, actual or perceived (p.

24). Fourth, he urges a "last resort test," a requirement that less coercive
measures be tried and found wanting before adoption of more coercive al
ternatives (p.

24). He calls the last test "adversarial justification," which

turns on whether a measure has been vetted by the institutions of constitu
19
tional governance and a free press.
lgnatieff does not go into much detail about what he regards as the im
plications of these "tests," or how the competing considerations they express
ought to be weighed against one another. This is a serious difficulty for any
one who would like to take guidance from lgnatieff; his standards raise
questions which they do little to resolve. The last resort test, for instance, is
implausible if, as Ignatieff's phrasing suggests, it would require a sequential
ramping-up in the severity of counterterror measures until the point of effi
cacy was reached. A security policy intended to prevent major attacks on
U.S. citizens could not, consistent with the government's responsibility to
protect the public, deliberately begin with measures suspected to be too
weak, then strengthen them after successful attacks vindicated that suspi
cion. It may be that Ignatieff intends to endorse something like the "least
restrictive alternative" requirement familiar from U.S. constitutional law. If
that is what he means, he should say so and distinguish between a
18. Pp. 23-24. As will become evident, lgnatieff uses democracy in three senses. Two ex
press distinct aspects, or versions, of what might more accurately be called constitutional principles:
a majoritarian, security-oriented "pragmatic democracy" and a minorities-protecting, rights-based,
procedure-preserving "moral democracy." Ignatieff also uses democracy in a somewhat more famil
iar sense, to refer to the institutional procedures, both governmental (such as representative
legislatures) and private (such as a free press), that channel the activity of collective self
govemance. Pp. 3--Q.
19. P. 24. lgnatieff's account of which features of democratic decisionmaking are properly
termed "adversarial," and what vetting function they serve, is almost completely undeveloped. See
infra Part V, where I address this difficulty in his position.
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preference for nonintrusive measures at any given moment, on the one hand,
and a requirement of ratcheting up intrusiveness only in response to failure,
on the other.
Moreover, the effectiveness test is uninformative in practice: no-one
would dispute the principle of promoting long-run security; but there will
always

be disagreement over the empirical conditions that determine

whether a specific policy-such as, signally, the invasion of Iraq-will leave
citizens more or less secure. In presenting the standard as he does, Ignatieff
is unhelpful: while he purports to provide principles for decisionmaking in
times of uncertainty, this principle has content only to the extent that the
uncertainty is resolved by unfolding events.
The weakness of both the last resort test and the effectiveness test com
promises the whole structure of Ignatieff's argument. The content of the
dignity test and the conservative test is somewhat clearer than that of the
effectiveness and last resort tests: the dignity and conservative tests pre
sumably

reflect basic human-rights norms and years of constitutional

jurisprudence. That said, however, the apparatus is useful only if one can
weigh the competing considerations-liberty on the one hand, security on
the other-against each other in a way that is at least somewhat determinate.
In Ignatieff's structure, dignity and institutional conservatism stand for
judgments about liberty, while effectiveness and the last-resort requirement
stand for judgments about security. If the second two are unworkable or in
determinate, then there is too little to weigh.
For this reason, an enormous amount of work will inevitably fall to Ig
natieff's

final

standard,

the

adversarial

justification

test.

Democratic

processes will produce judgments about the nature and extent of terrorist
threats and about which counterterror measures will conduce to security.
The same processes will also vet the consequences for civil liberties and
norms of dignity of counterterror measures. What Ignatieff takes the adver
sarial justification of democracy to be, and how he understands its nature
and limits, must therefore be at the heart of the question of whether his ac
count is either informative or workable. Ignatieff has a great deal to say on
these themes. Indeed, they take up much of The Lesser Evil, and are at once
the strongest and the weakest aspects of the book.
Ignatieff identifies two competing conceptions of self-government as
shaping American attitudes to the question of balancing liberty and security
and claims as his position a middle ground that finds room for the core val
ues of both conceptions. Although Ignatieff calls these conceptions of
"democracy," it would be more accurate to think of them as conceptions of
constitutional governance, ideas of the authoritative principles of self-rule.
The first, which he calls "pragmatic democracy," is majoritarian and is ori
ented to preserving the interests of the polity as the majority defines them,
above all the survival of the nation itself (pp.

2-4). The slogan of pragmatic

democracy is Justice Jackson's famous remark that the Constitution is not a
suicide pact. On this view, civil liberties should extend just so far as they do
not jeopardize the essential interests of the community and no farther. The
purpose of rights against government coercion is to protect the majority
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(from the government), and when such coercion seems unnecessary to pro
tect the majority, those rights have no more force. On this view, lgnatieff's
effectiveness test would be the only criterion for assessing coercive meas
ures-with the possible side-constraint of the last-resort test to avoid
unnecessary incursions on the liberty of the majority.
If this seems too crude a caricature of majoritarian democracy, or too
glib in imagining a bright line between the safety of the majority and the
liberty of a minority, it may be instructive to remember that in the current
debates over liberty and terror, the characteristic tradeoff is between the lib
erty of a relatively small and vulnerable population, such as noncitizens or
20
When

American Muslims, and the perceived security of the entire country.

the burdens of security are concentrated in a discrete and relatively powerless
population and the perceived benefits attach to all, the stage is set for the clas
21
sic danger of majoritarian democracy: "the tyranny of the majority."
Ignatieff identifies the second competing conception of democracy as a
"moral" view, in which democracy is not just "majority rule disciplined by
checks and balances," but is "also there to express the idea that individuals
matter intrinsically" (p.

5).

Once again, while the term "democracy" is intel

ligible for his purposes, Ignatieff is getting at something nearer to a
constitutional vision. Under ordinary conditions, these two conceptions are
complementary: individual rights and collective self-governance are two
sides of the same political coin. Liberal rights enforce a transparent gov
ernment, maintain the free speech that allows for criticism and inspection of
political arguments and decisions, and prevent the state from exercising ar
bitrary prerogatives, such as indefinite detention, that would tend to
undermine the freedom of the majority. Under the threat of terror, however,
the two can break apart in the way just described: the majority is tempted,
perhaps even obliged, to sacrifice the intrinsically important rights of mi
norities in pursuit of security.
In the face of this prospect, Ignatieff proposes a third view of the moral
commitments of democracy, which he calls a "lesser evil position" (p. 8).
This, too, is a constitutional vision, one specifically intended to illuminate
hard choices in times of crisis. It is helpful to understand this position on
three levels: casuistic, moral-psychological, and political. On the first, casu
istic level, lgnatieff contends that when the security of the majority and the
rights of minorities come into conflict, neither the leviathan of majoritarian
ism nor the bright-line protections of individual rights will deserve to govern
in all cases. Rather, judgment will be necessary to place the competing values
in their proper relationship. When values that have been mutually reinforcing
come into conflict, it becomes necessary to set them out explicitly and devise
a compass for navigating among their competing imperatives. It is in answer
20. See Ronald Dworkin, Terror and the Attack on Civil Liberties, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Nov. 6,
2003, at 37.
2 1 . The phrase is classically associated with Alexis de Tocqueville, although it expresses a
concern about majoritarian government that was widely held in the early nineteenth century. See
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans.,
Anchor Books 1969) ( 1 3th ed. 1850).

1508

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104: 1 50 1

to this need that lgnatieff proposes his "tests" for coercive antiterror meas
ures, with their attention to effectiveness, dignity, institutional conservatism,
the last-resort criterion, and adversarial justification.
On the moral-psychological level, the purpose of the lesser-evil position
is to focus the minds of decisionmakers on the fact that even lesser evil is

evil, and not rendered good by a tradeoff against something worse. As Ig
natieff points out, the reason to insist on this point is that "human beings are
so adept at inventing good intentions, coming up with plausible excuses for
atrocious consequences" (p. 13). Those who endorse one side of a tradeoff
between liberty and security will be perennially tempted to lapse into self
certainty and self-righteousness, as if their conclusions were self-evident
and justified without remainder. The effect on moral psychology of adopting
the lesser-evil approach is to check this temptation by calling even justified
evil by its right name.
On the political level, Ignatieff's lesser-evil approach expresses a con
ception of democracy distinct from the pragmatic and moral conceptions,
one much nearer the term's ordinary sense of popular self-government. lg
natieff is interested not so much in the institutional operation of self
government as in the kind of justification it requires citizens to give one an
other. He understands democracy as a practice of reason-giving that inhibits
moral solipsism. Refining his earlier assessment of the propensity to self
righteousness, lgnatieff maintains, "human beings can justify anything as a
lesser evil if they have to justify it only to themselves" (p. 14). Democracy
subjects justifications to at least a modicum of "open adversarial review"
among the branches of government, the political parties, and citizens (p. 24).
So long as some people speak out, from conviction, interest, or both, to in
sist that a lesser evil is still evil, the proponents of that evil will have more
difficulty pretending that it is no evil at all.
To endorse this idea, one need not accept the ambitious claims of some
that "deliberative democracy" produces a specific and (from some points of
22
view) particularly palatable set of policy prescriptions. All that one must
accept is the relatively modest idea that democratic processes constitute a
fragmented, imperfect, but actual tribunal of public justification, in which it
is-at least-impossible to pretend that there are no contrary views, or that
one's own would be obvious to all people of good faith. Ignatieff insists that
"[a] lesser evil morality is designed for skeptics" (p.

9).

He might also say

that democracy is a trainer of skeptics, inasmuch as it foregrounds the plu
rality of values and arguments in play in a political community.
Ignatieff rests much on the view that democracy exercises a moderating
influence on political judgment. This is the keystone of the lesser-evil posi
tion on one of Ignatieff's major concerns: the relationship between terror
attacks and the rule of law. The problem Ignatieff sets out to illuminate is
that in response to the threat of terror attacks--or to actual attacks--officials
will make exceptions to the standards generally regarded as defining rule of
law, whether violations of due process by emergency detentions and interro22.

See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1 996).
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gation or infringement on the division of powers, as by the president's de
creeing provisional policies unilaterally. How would Ignatieff's stylized
democratic types approach this hazard? In his account, the pragmatic de
mocrat would regard such exceptions as entirely consistent with rule of law,
since the underlying purpose of law is to maintain order and security, and
procedural protections are instruments to those ends, readily discarded when
they impede the same ends; for the moral democrat, procedural protections
instantiate the foundational commitment to individual dignity, and so are
inviolable even in circumstances of extreme exigency (pp.

32-33). For the

first, the hallmark of law is effectiveness in the present moment; for the sec
ond, it is precommitment to a set of rules and principles that hold even in
exceptional times.
Ignatieff accepts that precommitment is essential to the rule of law. He
argues, however, that law should be understood as precommitted not to a
specific set of protections though the heavens might fall, but rather to proce
dures of justification for authorizing exceptions to existing rules. These
procedures are the familiar features of "adversarial review" that Ignatieff
endorses elsewhere: open debate, the checks of bicameralism and the presi
dential veto, the scrutiny of a free press, and judicial review, to rehearse the
most familiar. For lgnatieff's position to represent a viable-and interest
ing-third way between the straw men of pure pragmatism and pure
("moral") principle, democratic processes must be the most reliable way of
keeping responses to terrorism within the bounds of Ignatieff's other stan
dards: dignity, institutional conservatism, effectiveness, and the test of the
last resort.
II. T H E STRENGTHS OF D EMOCRACY AND THE STRATEGY OF TERROR
Unfortunately, as Ignatieff realizes, there are reasons to doubt that de
mocratic procedures reliably check excessive responses to terrorism. Not
least among these reasons for doubt is that democracies tend recurrently to
overestimate threats to their survival, and so to react to perceived threats in
disproportionate ways. lgnatieff acknowledges this difficulty and engages it
directly, reflecting on the reasons democratic procedures may prove most
unreliable for balancing liberty and security at just the junctures where they
are most needed.
The paradox lies in the interaction of democracy with the political strat
egy of terrorism. As lgnatieff notes, life in democracies is characterized by a
great deal of personal freedom: to move from place to place, to keep com
munication private, and to share all sorts of spaces, from exurban malls to
Park Avenue to airliners, with strangers. Implicit in this freedom is trust: that
no one is about to disrupt the whole complex flow with a single, violent act
of bad faith. Terrorists breach that trust; they also take advantage of it:
openness and mobility frame the open door that the terrorist walks through
with his weapons.
Ignatieff argues that terrorist attacks pose not just a danger to life and
property, but also a threat to the political order of democratic societies. Such
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attacks tempt democrats to believe that one source of our strength-freedom
and openness-is in fact a source of weakness and vulnerability. In the grip
of this belief, democrats will be tempted to take defensive measures, such as
restrictions on civil liberty, that betray their own principles of rule of law
and the dignity of the person. They will also be tempted by offensive coun
termeasures which may in fact increase the danger they face, such as hasty
military action abroad. 23
Exaggerated reactions to terror by democratic societies play into the
strategy of terrorists in two ways. Defensive measures pose one kind of dan
ger. When a democratic society abandons its principles willy-nilly in the
face of terrorism, it gives credence to the political argument of the terrorists:
that the democratic legal order is only a mask of convenience, behind which
lurk naked force and violent self-interest.
Offensive actions present another danger. Disproportionate, ineffective,
or inapposite responses, such as the Iraq invasion may yet prove to have
been, can become recruiting events for terrorists. Such reprisals inadver
tently present the democratic society as a hegemon and oppressor, and thus
enable terrorists to offer themselves as the representatives and defenders of
the population that bears the brunt of the reprisal.
lgnatieff's argument, then, involves two contentions. One is that terror
ism-unlike, say, organized crime-is a political strategy: terrorists seek
to win ideological recruits, legitimate their own use of force, and delegiti
mate the political orders they oppose. When the democratic targets of
terror ignore this fact and simply respond to terrorism with overwhelming
force, they can play into the political strategy of terror. The second conten
tion is that democracies do not know their own strength. They are inclined
to imagine themselves as weaker than they are, and so to react to the threat
of terrorism in desperate ways that betray their principles and, paradoxi
cally, make them more rather than less vulnerable to the political strategy
of terrorism.
lgnatieff tries to address this problem with a brief, empirical reassurance
to democratic citizens. Surveying the uses of terrorism as a political tool in
Russia before the Soviet revolution, in Germany before the Nazi ascent to
power, and in later decades in Sri Lanka, Italy, Germany, Ireland, and Latin
America (pp. 54-8 1), he concludes that "while no democracy has ever been
brought down by terror, all democracies have been damaged by it, chiefly by
their own overreactions" (p. 80). In his view, the Russian Empire and Ger
many fell because of military and economic crises and constitutional
infirmities. Latin American responses to left-wing terrorism in the 1970s
and 1980s produced or deepened authoritarianism, but brought no victory to
terrorists. The European targets of terrorism neutralized their enemies effi23. I have long regarded the invasion of Iraq, for instance, as such a measure. See Jedediah
Purdy, Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments, ETHICS & INT'L AFF., Fall 2003, at 35. Ignatieff
has taken the opposite view. See supra note 37. This is but one example of the difficulty to be en
countered in getting any work out of Ignatieff's "effectiveness test." For my part, I am prepared
gladly to concede-and hope--that a tum in events will prove my view wrong; but I am not increas
ingly optimistic.

May 2006]

The Limits of Courage and Principle

151 1

ciently-and were at their weakest when, like the British in Northern Ire
land, they struck at civilian populations and violated basic legal norms, thus
converting ambivalent civilians into supporters of terrorist movements. The
nub of this empirical argument is that terrorists are never in themselves
powerful enough to threaten the existence of a democratic state; they suc
ceed only when they are able to frighten democrats enough that the terrorists
can control the terms of engagement and induce the exaggerated responses
they desire.
Ignatieff's historical accounts are extremely brief, and his choices are
eccentric. While it is true that assassinations and street violence contributed
to the run-up to both the Nazi seizure of power and the Bolshevik revolution
of October, 1917, I am not aware that either has been proffered as an exam
ple of the political potency of terrorism. More critically, Ignatieff makes
things too convenient for himself on this historical score. He contends that
terrorists defeat democracies only when constitutional vulnerabilities or ex
ogenous crises make the democracies vulnerable; otherwise, they win their
partial victories by inducing democracies to abandon their principles; thus
democracies, which if otherwise sound are not in existential danger from
terrorism, should not abandon their principles. But Ignatieff's historical
claim is not as reassuring as he would like it to be. It is all but axiomatic that
terrorists undertake their methods because they are too few or too weak to
march on the capitals of their enemies. If they can topple a state only by
compounding other weaknesses already afflicting it, well, that would seem
to be already conceded in their strategy.
Ignatieff contends that terrorists win only when we democrats help them
to win, as with authoritarian overreactions, or when history spins out of con
trol, as in Russia and Germany. The former point-which applies to the
flowering of Latin American authoritarianism in response to terror
supports his larger argument against compromising liberal principles. The
latter point does not: it is precisely the purpose of harsh antiterror measures
to prevent history from spinning out of control, or to brake the consequences
of its doing so. I believe what Ignatieff wants to say, but cannot quite bring
himself to say, is not that terrorists can never win, but that they might some
times win; yet, all things considered, we are nonetheless more likely to
preserve both our existence and our principles if we are extremely reluctant
to compromise those principles. In other words, a principled response to
terrorism is not a sure thing; it is a lesser evil. Rather than make this point
outright, Ignatieff seeks reassurance from empirical claims that do not quite
provide it.
III. TERRORIST NIHILISM AND DEMOCRATIC NIHILISM
The core of Ignatieff's argument, then, is not that terror poses no threat
to the existence of democratic societies and so that we should be entirely
confident in upholding civil liberties in the face of terrorist threats. The ar
gument is rather that the danger of losing our democratic identity in our
response to terror is a greater evil than the danger of being overpowered by
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terrorists (in conjunction, as noted above, with exogenous or internal crisis).
To appreciate this argument, one must understand the mechanisms by which
24
Ignatieff believes we democrats (or liberals) can be induced to give up our
democratic identity.
lgnatieff puts it this way:
What happens when political violence ceases to be motivated by political
ideals and comes to be motivated by ... emotional forces ... :

ressentiment

and envy, greed and blood lust, violence for its own sake? What happens
when counterterrorism, likewise, ceases to be motivated by principle and
comes to be driven by the same complex of emotional drives? (p.

114)

Let us take this point step by step, for a great deal is contained in it.
First, lgnatieff proposes that the motivations of political life can change
from interest guided by principle to an incommensurable set of psychologi
cal forces: resentment and a delight in violence for its own sake, or in the
intoxicating experience of potency that it provides. Second, he identifies the
motives of at least some terrorists-lgnatieff believes most of al-Qaeda be
longs here-with this latter orientation, which he terms "nihilism," or
violence undertaken for reasons outside of principle. Third, he takes the in
novative step of suggesting that the threat of nihilism is reciprocal (even if
not exactly symmetrical). We liberals, in the course of battling nihilism,
could become nihilistic ourselves. Put differently, we could leave principle
so far behind, and grow so engaged by the dubious psychic gratifications of
a "war on terror," that we would become alien to ourselves, unrecognizable
from the vantage point of our present, principled self-understanding. We
would be transformed into our enemies.
Ignatieff proposes to sketch the way in which this psychological decline
into nihilism can take place. His vocabulary for this description is broadly
psychoanalytic: he describes the displacement of powerful drives-for
status, power, or sex-onto violence, which becomes a fetishistic embodi
ment of those aims. Status and power are relatively straightforward.
Violence can come to be identified with, and to seem the only or the purest
means to, "personal aggrandizement, immortality, fame, or power" (p. 1 17).
Who does not recognize the fantasy of the upright man with a gun, or the
true believer with a bomb? From Dirty Harry to the suicide bombers of
Gaza, the occasions change, but the assertion of power and the demand for
respect are the same. The consummation of this tendency is in the death
cult, in which suicide bombing assumes the place of the highest human end
(p. 1 17).
lgnatieff also speculates that "[c]hanneling sexual desire away from life
is an important process in the creation of the death cult" (p. 126). He pro
poses two specific ways in which this may happen. Violence can be
conceived as itself a kind of erotic consummation, as among the female sui24. It is perhaps better at this point to use "liberal" rather than "democratic." lgnatieff him
self switches at this point in the discussion, although what is under discussion is what he calls the
"moral" conception of democracy, centered on a liberal respect for procedure and the rights of the
individual.
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cide bombers of the Tamil Tiger terrorist movement, for whom "[d]ying was
reconceived as an orgasmic reunion with the [Tiger] leader in death" (p.
126). Sexual energy can also support violence through revulsion, by con
tributing to a loathing for the victims, a "phobic sense of pollution" that
derives from the neurotic terror of sexuality, but expresses itself in disgust at
a whole class of victims, whether members of a decadent West or an ethnic
other (p. 127). One need not adopt the psychoanalytic vocabulary that Ig
natieff prefers in order to take seriously his account of the seduction of
violence. As he points out, it "isn't necessary to delve into the question of
why human beings love violence and seek to use weapons as instruments of
power and even of sexual gratification" to accept that experience shows us
doing so over and again (p. 121).
The seduction may hold for the opponents of terrorists as well as for the
terrorists themselves. As Ignatieff rather delicately puts it, "[t]he type of
personality attracted into a counterterror campaign may not have any intrin
sic or reflective commitment to democratic values of restraint" (p. 12 1). It is
perhaps not necessary to be so quite delicate after the revelations of Ameri
can torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq: those who are invited to use the
weapons of violence against enemies may come to love the use of those
25
weapons too much. Nor can one restrict this concern to the violent behav
ior of line soldiers. At the highest levels of government, the pleasures of
power and of moral self-certainty can be just as powerful as in the prison
26
yard. The risk of nihilism lurks both among terrorists and in the liberal
societies they attack.
In the background of Ignatieff's argument is his Scottish Enlightenment
method: the view of moral analysis as best conducted diagnostically, in
terms of the order of the passions that constitutes a personality. On
Ignatieff's account, nihilism is best understood not as a doctrine, but as a
passional composition in which delight in yiolence and domination,
fantasies of omnipotence and immortality, and other antisocial passions
define the personality. Ignatieff adds to this Isaiah Berlin's fascination with
the darkest forms of modern politics, and, no doubt, his own travels in lands
rent by nationalist violence. These cast a shadow on the diagnostic method
of the passions but do not displace its emphasis on the structure of
personality.
Ignatieff proposes a view of political society, and specifically of the pur
poses of liberal constitutionalism, that reflects these concerns. He identifies
"the control of violence and coercion in the name of human dignity and
freedom" as lying at the heart of "the spirit of [liberal] constitutional soci
ety," and identifies "this constitutional identity" as "all that we have to resist
the temptations of nihilism" (p. 143). He continues, "liberal democracy has
been crafted over centuries precisely in order to combat the temptations of
nihilism, to prevent violence from becoming an end in itself' (p. 144). This
is a remarkable claim. It proposes that nihilistic violence is a default
25.

See Chris Hedges, On War, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Dec. 16, 2004, at 8.

26.

See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Eyeless in Iraq, N.Y. REV. BOOKS , Oct. 23, 2003, at 24.
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position, or at least a perennial tendency in h uman affairs, which principled
forms of political community must perennially labor to avert. In holding this
view of human nature, Ignatieff takes a deeply pessimistic attitude.
This was not the attitude of the U.S. constitutional Framers, who mostly
saw the purpose of liberal society as nearer securing natural liberties and
8
7
promoting prosperity.2 Even James Madison's Federalist No. 10,2 the most
influential document of pessimism to come from the Framers, presents fac
tion as a constant problem born first of competing interests, only second of
enthusiasm and zealotry; but Madison, whose attention to the antisocial pas
9
sions reflected his schooling in Scottish Enlightenment thought,2 gave no
indication that he regarded "violence [as] an end in itself' as the default
situation or primary threat which constitutional government had to keep at
bay. As for other liberal thinkers, John Locke regarded the state of nature as
vexed by "inconveniences" from conflicts over property rights, not a war of
all against all; his account of constitutional government is all to do with se
0
curing natural rights and property claims, not staving off nihilism. 3 Even
Thomas Hobbes, a dubious liberal but certainly a theorist of the rule of law
and a pessimist if ever the mainstream of Anglo-American thought has pro
duced one, did not believe that violence for its own sake held much charm
for people. His "war of all against all," which made life "nasty, brutish, and
short," was driven by a combination of epistemic uncertainty and the im
pulse to self-preservation: people struck out against others because they
could not know who might otherwise strike them first, not because the blow
delighted them. 31 The founding of a sovereign government solved the epis
temic problem by creating a univocal source of enforceable rules that made
behavior predictable and so decoupled self-preservation from the need fo r
.
preemptive attacks on others. 32
lgnatieff's idea of the motivations that underlie political life does have
much in common with that of Edmund B urke, another student of the pas
sions, who believed that devotion to the moral identity of the political
community checke d the impulses of violence and zealotry which would oth
erwise take command.33 C uriously,34 in this respect he also has much in

27. On the political orientation of the Framers, see GoROON S. WooD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION ( 1992).
28.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

29. On the influence of Scottish thought on the American founding generation, see generally
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 5.
30. See JOHN LOCKE, T\vo TREATISES OF GovERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1960) (1698).
31.
(1651).
32.

See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
See id.

33. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 247-48 (Conor
Cruise O'Brien ed., Penguin Books 1969) ( 1790).
34. I say "curiously" because Smith is so often associated with a Panglossian view of market
society, when in fact he was a profound student of the darker, domination-seeking aspect of human
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common with Adam Smith, who portrayed not political life, but social and
economic existence, as defined by its proportion of two competing organiz
ing principles: domination and submission on the one hand, and reciprocity
5
and consent on the other.3 Ignatieff's stress on the urgency of maintaining
constitutional identity in the face of terror-particularly nihilistic terror
6
does not simply reflect prudence or a general preference for principle. 3 It
rather expresses quite a specific and shadowed view of human motivation,
and of the forces that can keep its worst potentials in check. Ignatieff's is a
significantly darker view than that of the majority of the U.S. constitutional
tradition .
That Ignatieff sees a darker world than most liberal theorists is not a
criticism of his account of liberal constitutionalism, but a characterization
that helps in classifying his thought. Moreover, the fact that Ignatieff's posi
tion is somewhat apart from the main line of liberal constitutionalism
hitherto does not disqualify it from being the right characterization today.
Ignatieff's exegetical level is not legal, but metalegal. He sets out to charac
terize the primary threats to social order, liberty, and human dignity that the
law confronts, and the nature and limits of its resources for confronting and
managing these threats. In a time when nihilistic enemies present a major
threat to those social and legal ends, and their threat raises the temptation of
reciprocal nihilism, it may be that Ignatieff's pessimistic cons titutionalism is
more salient than it would otherwise be.
IV. LESSER EVILS IN AN AGE OF ARMAGEDDON
What changed on September 11, 2001? Ignatieff offers a two-part an
swer to this contentious question. First, the destruc tion of the World Trade
Center created a vastly important precedent. As the assassination of Czar
Alexander II by Russian nihilists (as terrorist assassins were then called)
created a model for a century of ideological murder, so the spectacular blow
against the United States, which redirected U.S. foreign policy and very
possibly the course of history, gave an example that is sure to inspire imita
tors and successors (pp. 152-53).
Second, even though the September 1 1th attackers did not use any of the
now-famous triad of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons , their attack
put the world on notice of the possibility of spectacular, high-casualty inci
dents. Such events have become plausible thanks to a set of causes already
in motion before the twin towers fell. One is the rise in the number of terror
ists who are essentially nondeterrable because they are tied neither to any
nature. I discuss this aspect of Smith's thought in A World of Passions. See Purdy, supra note 7 at
25.
35.

See SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 5.

36. lgnatieff's preference for principle may represent an evolution in his thinking. In The
Warrior's Honor, he argued that abstract principles have little purchase on people at war, whose
role-specific sense of honor as warriors was much more motivationally effective than any general
rules. See IGNATIEFF, WARRIOR'S HONOR, supra note I. I am indebted to Jamie Boyle for this obser
vation.
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state or place nor to any population against which they would seek to avoid
reprisals. (Ignatieff contends that Palestinian terrorists, for ins tance, are
unlikely to use chemical weapons against Israelis because of the prospect of
retaliation against other Palestinians-not obviously true, but not a negligi
ble point.) Another is the decline in the relative cost of producing and
storing "weapons of mass destruction," which means that such weapons are
no longer necessarily the monopoly of states, but are for the first time acces
sible to disaffected groups or even individuals. A third cause is the near
collapse of government in many parts of the former Soviet Union and sub
Saharan Africa. The Soviet collapse potentially puts nuclear material and
other hazardous s ubstances on the market, while the African crises mean
that in large swathes of territory, s uch as parts of Somalia and Sudan, the
nominally governing state is not strong enough to exclude or suppress ter
rorist groups that might acquire or develop s uch weapons. Taken together,
these facts make high-casualty terror attacks relatively likely.
On Ignatieff's account, the real horror of s uch attacks is that they could
achieve what he contends terrorism has never been able to manage in the
past: the defeat of a democracy.
A succession of mass casualty attacks, using weapons of mass destruction,
would leave behind zones of devastation sealed off for years and a pall of
mourning, anger, and fear hanging over our public and private lives. Such
attacks would destroy the existential security on which democracy de
pends.. . . We might find ourselves living within a national security state
on permanent alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks, and
permanent detention camps for suspicious aliens and recalcitrant citizens.
(pp. 1 5 3-54)

It is indeed a dystopian image. It is, moreover, clearly possible, if not
now then within the next ten to twenty years, depending on the rate of diffu
sion of the most destruc tive technologies.
This changes the nature of the threat that terrorism poses to liberty. Even
if one accepts my modification of Ignatieff's claim that history shows terror
ists categorically unable to topple liberal states, for more than a century the
chief threat terrorists could exercise was to tempt, goad, or alarm liberal
s tates into giving up their freedom in a spasm of overreaction. Today, on
Ignatieff's account, terror for the first time poses a symmetrical Scylla and
Charybdis of threats to liberty. On the one hand, it remains all too possible
that fear itself could drive us to throw essential protections overboard in fa
vor of a national sec urity state with an imperial executive and unaccountable
counterterrorism agencies. On the other hand, if our counterterror efforts
fail, terrorist attacks might prove devastating enough to all but impose such
a security state. Before, we had only to avoid the reef of our own overzeal
ous reprisals. Now, there is a needle to thread. Liberal societies cannot
afford to give up their liberty, but neither can they afford to hold open the
door that might admit devastating attacks.
This challenge raises the stakes enormously for efforts to prevent terror
ist attacks without compromising basic liberties. Ignatieff makes fairly
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specific recommendations for these efforts. H e urges that the infrastructure
of international commerce be reformed to ensure full monitoring of every
thing that crosses borders: shipping containers, goods, and people. In a
sense, all international activity will have to adopt some of the sec urity fea
tures of airline travel, even at substantially increased cost, to prevent the
now-proverbial suitcase bomb from entering the United States at a maritime
port or across the Rio Grande. Just as important, antiproliferation e fforts,
directed at keeping nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons out of private
hands, will have to be fully funded and far more consistently pursued than
has recently been true . Antiproliferation regulation should also clamp down
on laboratories and scientists working (legally) on technologies essential to
weapons of mass destruction: researchers must become accustomed to
monitoring and to restrictions on their p ublicizing information. Such meas
ures, if adopted, would amount to a security tax on the time and money of
industries and individuals that have benefited from the same open systems
that now facilitate threats. lgnatieff contends that the cost of these restric
tions would be outstripped by the benefit: preventing devastating attacks
without recklessly sacrificing liberties.
Two other of Ignatieff's proposals are more dramatic. Following many
commentators, he urges the United States to put itself squarely on the side
of promoting democracy in the Middle East, where " [t]or sixty years, West
ern states have been on the wrong side in a s uppressed civil war between
Arab peoples and their governments" (p. 156). lgnatieff is probably right
that "apocalyptic nihilism feeds on political despair," and thus in the long
run democracy is an important disincentive to terrorism (p. 156). That does
not tell us much, however, about the wis dom of any particular action that
disrupts the authoritarian status quo in the Arab Middle East. To take one
example, Ignatieff was a cautious s upporter of the United States invasion of
Iraq, a project that at the time of this writing increasingly seems a spectacu
lar failure of the democracy-promotion aim. At a minimum, this adventure
in moral-political j udgment highlights the difficulty of making good on a
7
nominal commitment to promoting democracy. 3 This is surely an area in
which lgnatieff's effectiveness test will have hard going in distinguishing
between policies that will make us more safe in the long run and those likely
to endanger us. It is also an area in which the psychological hazards of self
righteousness and delight in the exercise of power, which lgnatieff aptly
parses elsewhere, can be expected to enjoy considerable influence. 38
Ignatieff also supports what he calls "preemptive war," although he ap
pears to accept the argument of the B ush administration that, in striking
terrorists, preemption properly shades over into what would once have been
called prevention. 39 The doctrine of preemptive war has traditionally
37. For lgnatieffs reflections on this issue, see Michael lgnatieff, The Burden, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2003 § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
38. See, e.g., JoNATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TwENTIETH CEN
TURY (1999); CHRIS HEDGES, WAR Is A FORCE THAT GIVES Us MEANING (2002); Purdy, supra note 7.
39.

For the distinction, see MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 1 43-51 (2004).
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40
pictured an attack on the assembling forces of an enemy. The single mod
ern instance of preemption in conventional war was Israel's ( 1967)
devastation of the Egyptian air force in anticipation of an imminent Arab
attack. By contrast, lgnatieff characterizes preemptive strikes against terror
ists as including attacks on states that harbor terrorists-including, one
would imagine, Afghanistan even before September 1 1, 200 1 (p. 163).
Ignatieff insists that preemptive attacks should be defensible, and actu
ally defended, in light of public reason. The alleged threat should be
candidly aired, with attention to the opinions of other governments and pub
lics and to the norms of international law, as well as to domestic views (p.
164). Nonetheless , Ignatieff is clear that he believes unilateral action is ap
propriate when international approval is not forthcoming: therefore, the
appeal to other countries and multilateral institutions appears to be less a
limit on the freedom to conduct s uch war than an incentive to formulate
clear reasons for preemptive war-the same role Ignatieff assigns to domes
tic democratic processes (p. 165).
As with lgnatieff's endorsement of democracy-promotion in Arab coun
tries, the example of Iraq raises some troubling q uestions for his argument
that democratic politics promotes public reason about proposed preemptive
wars. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was undertaken as a preemptive war, in re
sponse to the allegedly imminent threat of Iraqi-backed terror attacks. No
evidence has emerged that such a threat ever existed. Some evidence has
emerged that the B ush administration distorted the contemporary evidence
4
in making the case for war. 1 Nonetheless, George W. B ush was reelected,
and a s ubstantial share of Americans falsely believed well after the invasion
4
that the deposed Iraqi regime had been proven to have had illegal weapons. 2
Those Americans tend strongly to support the B ush administration. This
sequence of events should at least give pause to any confident expectation
that democratic decisionmaking will uphold public reason. Indeed, because
the case for preemptive war always rests on an appeal to popular fear (of an
enemy attack), advocates of preemptive war will always have the chance to
take advantage of j ust what Ignatieff identifies as a perennial weakness of
democratic politics: the exaggerated feeling of v ulnerability to terror.
The power of democratic reason-giving forms the heart of lgnatieff's ar
gument, a rationalist answer to problems he has diagnosed in light of
pervasive human irrationality. He proposes that the only guide in balancing
liberty and security is a serious and diligent commitment to the principles of
liberal freedoms and democratic argument. In reading The Lesser Evil and
reflecting on the events of the last few years , it is difficult not to wonder
whether this is too thin a reed for o ur trust.

40.

See id.

4 1 . For a discussion of the uses o f intelligence i n the run-up to the Iraq war, see GEORGE
PACKER, THE ASSASSINS' GATE: AMERICA IN IRAQ 39-100 (2005).
42. For instance, a poll conducted in spring of 2003 found that forty-one percent of respon
dents believed the United States had found illegal weapons in Iraq. See Program on Int'! Policy
Attitudes, What's New (June 4, 2003), http://PIPA.org/whatsnew/html/new_6_04_03.html.
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Do Ignatieff's study of the passions and implicit commitment to the idea
of value pluralism contribute anything to his normative reasoning? Ig
natieff's five

"tests"

for coercive action

are neither exceptional

nor

exceptionable. Their form--criteria for reasoning with no lexical ordering or
weighting-provides no specific answer to any particular question. Their
content is something close to the middle ground occupied by many prag
matic liberals, who accept both that antiterrorism policies must be effective
and that procedural checks are important for avoiding always-tempting
abuses. Does the philosophical background help, or is it adornment for prin
ciples that could as well stand on their own? Or, does the philosophy get in
the way of pragmatically productive thinking?
In one sense, at least, the philosophical traditions are indispensable for
Ignatieff. The diagnostic bent of both passions theory and value pluralism
inclines him to ask not so much what our values should be as what it means
for our values to be what they are. The purpose of Ignatieff's schematic
summary of "pragmatic" and "moral" conceptions of democracy is to re
mind readers that most of us are inarticulately committed to both sets of
values and must work to keep them in balance-particularly in new circum
stances, when old arrangements between the two will not necessarily serve
or will come into jeopardy. The intent of his discussion of nihilism is to pre
sent a picture of the perennial human dangers that form the backdrop to
liberal democracy and contribute to its urgency.
In times of ordinary law and politics, when institutions work routinely
and the balance among competing public values stands more or less by con
vention, Ignatieff's mode of reflection may be superfluous, if illuminating to
those who find such thought congenial. It comes into its own, however,
when events force a reorientation of institutions and re-sorting of principles.
In those circumstances, it is critical that we understand the principles that
undergird our rules and institutions, and, in turn, the moral aspirations and
recurrent threats that give those principles their importance. Otherwise, we
will be setting out without a compass. The Lesser Evil is an orienteering
exercise for a time that needs more of them.
This, however, is where Ignatieff's strength becomes a weakness by en
couraging a serious omission. In describing the conflict among legitimate
liberal and democratic values, he takes as his object the experience of the
exemplary democratic citizen. Indeed, it is not just any citizen he seems to
envision, but a peculiarly cerebral and high-minded one. His discussion,
with its emphasis on the struggle between nihilism and principle, evokes the
philosophical wars of Enlightenment and mid-century Existentialist agon,
struggles between stern codes of morality and the unbridled destructiveness
43
of those who have concluded that God is dead, and all is perrnitted.
43. See ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT (Anthony Bower trans.,
Albert A. Knopf 1 956) ( 1 95 1 ); PIERRE MANENT, THE CITY OF MAN (Marc A. LePain trans., Prince
ton Univ. Press 1 998) ( 1 994); JAMES D. WILKINSON, THE INTELLECTUAL RESISTANCE IN EUROPE
( 1 981).
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Ignatieff writes in the book's peroration, "[t]he challenge of an ethical life in
liberal democracy is to live up, as individuals, to the engagements expressed
in our constitutions and to seek to ensure that these engagements are kept in
respect of the least advantaged of our fellow citizens" (p. 169). Preparing to
close one chapter, he claims, "it has always been true that the force which
sustains the liberty of the many has been the intransigent courage of the
few" (p. 53). The battleground of principle and nihilism is, apparently, the
soul of the mindful citizen-and not just any citizen, but "the few" whose
"courage" prevents the degradation of their "fellow citizens." The person he
has in mind is a philosopher by temperament (and perhaps education) and
an engaged citizen out of a sense of duty, and is positively obsessed with
principle and its complexity. The struggles among values and passions that
Ignatieff describes occurs only in two domains: diffusely, in the whole pol
ity as viewed with the eye of God, and specifically in intellectuals like
Michael Ignatieff.
This is where Ignatieff might have been much more helpful on his
themes had he thought and written more like a lawyer and less as a student
of values and passions. Lawyers--even academic lawyers--do not identify
conflicts of value, particularly those that carry major practical conse
quences, without immediately asking a set of institutional questions. When a
practical problem arises in which these values are implicated-for instance,
which requirements of due process apply to terror suspects?-the following
questions come fast: Which part of which branch of government takes the
first crack at it? Congress? The presidency? The military? Which part gets
the final say? If the courts do, should they dictate a specific set of proce
44
dures, as in the long-ago Miranda ruling, or invite other branches to
formulate a new version of due process for eventual court review, as in the
6
recent Hamdt"45 and Rasut decisions? And how will citizens be able to con
test the decision? By putting pressure on Congress, by voting out the
president, or only by supporting a constitutional amendment? Without an
swers to these questions, the diagnosis of values and passions remains in a
real sense unreal, merely notional. This is so because there is no way of
knowing the process by which the values and passions of any citizen or the
whole population will--0r will not-be translated into actions taken on be
half of the polity.
To say this is not simply to criticize Ignatieff from outside his project.
On the contrary, these questions are integral to understanding the implica
tions of his diagnosis, even on its own terms. The most distinctive aspect of
Ignatieff 's argument, the diagnosis of the passions, founds his account of the
political goal of terror : inducing democracies to betray their own principles
in spasms of fear and exaggerated measures of self-defense. But the fore
most check that democracies have cultivated against this hazard is not a
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stalwart civic soul; it is institutional arrangements that limit the power of
panic to unsettle existing principles and procedures. The most valuable con
tributions to lgnatieff's themes engage both the passions and institutional
arrangements, with judgments about the first informing conclusions about
the second. Vincent Blasi's classic discussion of the First Amendment as a
47
check against political hysteria is one example. Bruce Ackerman's recent
proposal for a structure of time-limited emergency powers with a mandatory
sunset provision, to ensure that decisions taken in times of exigency do not
48
become permanent, is another. Both ask the question of Federalist No. 1 0 :
Given what we know about the instability of human nature, how can we de
sign a government that appropriately checks and channels the passions most
likely to distort political decisions? Because Ignatieff fails to take this step,
it is not clear that The Lesser Evil deserves the designation its subtitle
claims, as a work in "political ethics." Because it cannot guide decisions
taken in politics, the book is nearer a work in political psychology.
It is also unclear whether, even as psychology, Ignatieff's account gets
the experience of liberal constitutionalism quite right. He embraces the idea
that constitutional liberty rests in good part on ordinary citizens' identifica
tion with the rights and freedoms, the form of justice, that their political
49
order provides. His account of that identification, though, with its stress on
the agon between principle and nihilism, may capture the experience of only
a philosophically minded sliver of the citizenry. It may be that the identifica
tion that most Americans experience with constitutional liberty is a rather
more subtle matter of habits of judgment and evaluation-a sort of civic
second nature. Americans express such a second nature when they reflex
ively invoke their "constitutional rights" to defend basic freedoms and
entitlements, whether or not these appear in the text of the Constitution. Ig
natieff has nothing really to say about this ordinary form of political
commitment, nor about the actual institutional activity that keeps govern
ment approximately in line with these half-intuitive values.
Michael Ignatieff has written a book in defense of liberty, in praise of
democracy, and directed at clarifying and fortifying "the intransigent cour
age of the few" (p. 53). There is nothing wrong with this. Indeed, it is too
rare that the task is conducted with Ignatieff's learning and subtlety. The
fact remains, though, that the liberty of the many depends foremost on their
own mainly unphilosophical devotion to free government, and to institutions
of sound design that keep power from straying too far from liberty. The
book that describes the fate of those bulwarks in an age of terror has not yet
been written.
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